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Abstract
Social choice theory in Economics and Political Science has highlighted that competing notions of rational social
choice are irreconcilable. This established wisdom is based on hypothetical thought experiments, mathematical im-
possibility theorems, and computer simulations. We provide new empirical evidence that challenges the practicality of
these discouraging predictions. We analyze the ballots from thirteen presidential elections of the American Psycholog-
ical Association. We report on an empirical comparison of the Condorcet, the Borda, the Plurality, the Anti-Plurality,
the Single Transferable Vote, the Coombs, and the Plurality Runoff rules. We find that these rules frequently agree
both on the winner and on the social order. Bootstrapping reveals that the coherence among competing rules is a
property of the empirical distribution of voters’ choices, and it is not specific to a particular sample. Our findings are
highly robust to changes in the modeling assumptions that enter our analysis. These findings suggest many interesting
open research questions for the emerging paradigm of behavioral social choice: Why do competing social choice
procedures agree in real-world electorates? How broadly does the accumulated evidence against the social choice
conundrum generalize to other electorates and other candidate choice sets?
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Choosing a president of a country or of a professional society, selecting a CEO of an organization, determining a good
time for a group lunch, or ranking job applicants are just a few of the multitude of collective decisions that groups,
organizations, and society face daily. Voting rules, i.e., mathematical preference aggregation mechanisms, have been
studied intensely over a wide range of fields, especially in political science, mathematics, and economics, and also in
philosophy and psychology.
To illustrate the fundamental conundrum of social choice, consider a hypothetical example of what can happen
when a group of 13 people needs to rank 3 candidates. Writing A  B to denote that A is strictly preferred to B,
consider the preference rankings of 13 voters in Table 1.1. We briefly compare the outcomes of four of the most
Table 1.1: Hypothetical Preference Profiles of 13 Voters for Three Choice Options, A,B, and C.
Ranking Number of Voters
A  B  C 5
C  B  A 3
C  A  B 1
B  C  A 3
A  C  B 1
heavily studied social choice procedures: the Borda, the Plurality, the Single Transferable Vote, and the Condorcet
rules.
According to the centuries old Borda procedure (Borda, 1770), the first ranked candidate of each voter scores two
points, and the second ranked scores one point. According to the Borda rule the social order is therefore B  A  C,
with a 14 : 13 : 12 point tally, suggesting that the social choice, here the Borda winner, ought to be B.
But is B really the best option for this electorate? Application of the most commonly used contemporary voting
method, the plurality rule provides the social order A  C  B, with a 6 : 4 : 3 tally. Here, each voter gives one vote
to one option, namely the one whom he ranks first. From this perspective, the recommended social choice, here the
Plurality winner, ought to be A.
Next, consider the most heavily promoted procedure for electoral reform across all types and levels of government
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in the United States. This is the popular multistage procedure labeled instant runoff in the popular media. This rule
is also known as the Hare system, the alternative vote, and is often discussed as the single transferable vote (STV)
among election scholars (Hare, 1857). STV chooses the Plurality winner when that option was ranked first by more
than half of the voters. Otherwise, the option with the smallest number of plurality votes is eliminated, the remaining
options are re-ranked, and a new plurality score is computed among the remaining options. Here, using the very same
voter profile, B is eliminated, and STV elects option C, hence disagreeing with both the Borda and the Plurality
procedures.
We have come full circle: each of the three alternatives B, A, and C has, in turn, been identified as best aggregate
choice using a major voting procedure. In fact, the situation is even more dire!
One of the founding scholars of social choice theory, the Marquis de Condorcet (Condorcet, 1785), considered yet
another, but very simple and attractive rule of social preference formation: according to the Condorcet rule, a candidate
is the winner if she beats all competitors in pairwise elections. The group prefers candidate A over candidate B when
a majority of voters prefer A over B. The critical problem with this rule is known as the famous Condorcet paradox
of majority cycles because the rule can completely fail to generate a winner due to intransitive social preferences. The
possibility of majority cycles threatens that a society could become paralyzed when facing a collective decision.
Table 1.2: The Borda, the Plurality, the Alternative Vote, and the Condorcet outcomes
for the hypothetical profile of Table 1.1.
Voting Rule Borda Plurality Alternative Vote Condorcet
Winner B A C None
Loser C B B None
Social Order B  A  C A  C  B C  A  B Cycle
The first three methods yield three different ‘legitimate’ election winners,
whereas the Condorcet rule yields an intransitive cycle without a winner.
Returning to our hypothetical voting profile, we find a Condorcet paradox, indeed: option A is preferred to option
B by a majority (7 voters prefer A to B whereas only 6 voters prefer B to A), B is majority preferred to C, and C is
majority preferred to A, hence yielding an intransitive cycle.
Table 1.2 summarizes the social choice conundrum we have just reviewed. Examples like this abound in the
theoretical social choice literature (Arrow, 1951; Mueller, 2003; Saari, 1994, 2000; Sen, 1970). These examples
illustrate how easily one can create a situation in which competing voting rules disagree massively on the legitimate
winners and losers of an election and hence, can provide four completely different social orders. Extensive and
sophisticated mathematical work, such as Kenneth Arrow’s (Arrow, 1951) famous “impossibility theorem” explain
why there is no way around the conundrum: different procedures are based on different, and mutually irreconcilable,
mathematical properties (axioms). After intense study in the second part of the 20th century, social choice theory has
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fallen out of fashion, with most scholars fully disillusioned about the prospect of finding a mathematical solution to
the problem of rational social choice.
Because social choice theory rests on irrevocable mathematical truths, and because access to large and sufficiently
rich empirical data sets is difficult, very few scholars have asked the question whether, where, and when the famous
social choice conundrum bears out in empirical data. The theoretical predictions from classical theory hinge on the
possibility, not necessity, of disagreement. Whether different social choice methods clash with each other depends
on the profile being aggregated. For example, whenever the voters are unanimous in their preference rankings, say
everyone has preference ranking A  B  C, then all major aggregation methods yield that same ranking A  B 
C as the social order. Much prior work on the likelihood of incompatible social choice outcomes across competing
methods has hinged on distributional assumptions about the voter profiles, assumptions that many scholars consider
empirically unrealistic.
We analyze ballots from presidential elections of the American Psychological Association (APA) for the years
from 1998 to 2009. These elections provide a rich source of full and partial ranking ballots for five alternatives. The
number of ballots in the APA elections typically exceeds 15,000. This is two to three orders of magnitude more than
the sample size of most laboratory studies on consensus methods (see Hastie and Kameda, 2005). Another major
advantage of these data sets over laboratory data is that, as Chamberlin et al. (1984) explain, the APA elections can be
used as proxies for major political elections with real stakes.
Consistent with previous empirical studies (among others Felsenthal et al., 1993; Niemi, 1970; Regenwetter et al.,
2006) we find no trace of a Condorcet paradox. Building on prior work, we also find that all six voting rules under
consideration are coherent with Condorcet extremely frequently, especially when we concentrate our attention on the
winners and the losers, i.e., the first and last ranked candidates in the social order.
Before we report on our empirical analysis, we first provide in Section 1.1 a summary of relevant background infor-
mation about classical social choice results. Section 2 introduces the APA data and explains a few key methodological
considerations. Section 3.1 describes and organizes our empirical findings. Section 4 lays out an open landscape of
interesting questions for future behavioral social choice research.
1.1 The Social Choice Conundrum
The normative literature on social choice has highlighted in systematic ways how profoundly various voting rules differ
mathematically from each other (see the summaries in Chamberlin and Cohen, 1978; Tideman, 2006), how different
rules can systematically disagree with each other on the winners (see Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1978; Gehrlein and
Lepelley, 2000), and how often most voting methods disagree with the Condorcet rule as a benchmark of rational social
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choice (see Adams, 1997; Gehrlein, 1985, 1992, 1999; Merrill, 1984, 1985). The conundrum becomes seemingly
insurmountable once we consider the impossibility results. Impossibility theorems such as Arrow’s theorem (see
Arrow, 1951) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (see Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) state that every voting
rule is flawed, because every conceivable rule must violate at least one property out of some set of reasonable properties
of rational preference aggregation. For example, since the Condorcet rule can produce majority cycles, it violates the
property of ”unrestricted domain” or ”universality”. In particular, the Condorcet rule does not necessarily provide a
unique winner or a transitive social order. The Condorcet paradox of cyclical majorities has been explored extensively
in the social choice literature (see among others Condorcet, 1785; Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b; Gehrlein, 1983;
Saari, 1994).
The combination of issues like the ones we just reviewed has led social choice theorists to become extremely pes-
simistic about the possibility of meaningful consensus formation (Riker, 1982). The theoretical literature demonstrates
a plethora of possible levels of disagreement among different voting rules, and it predicts that the Condorcet paradox
will be ubiquitous on unrestricted domains. The intensity of pessimistic predictions was further enhanced through
analytical and simultation results about the likelihood of Condorcet paradoxes based on the famous Impartial Culture
assumption (see Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b). List and Goodin (2001) and Regenwetter et al. (2006) showed that
the likelihood of a Condorcet paradox changes dramatically under even minute deviations from the Impartical Culture
assumption. Whether a Condorcet paradox occurs in a random sample from a hypothetical culture depends entirely on
the theoretical assumptions about the nature of that culture. “Cultures of indifference,” in which all candidates are tied
by majority rule at the level of the theoretical distribution, are misleading because the majority outcome in samples of
odd size converges to the majority tie in the underlying distribution with probability zero as the sample size increases.
Instead, that majority tie is replaced by artificial majority cycles. The literature extrapolated from the Impartial Cul-
ture assumption that, in large electorates and with more than three candidates, a majority winner is unlikely even to
exist (Riker, 1982). Based on this misconception, the literature fosters a questionable policy recommendation that one
should avoid the Condorcet rule in real elections (e.g. Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997).
Another branch of the social choice literature investigated domain restrictions that help avoid the Condorcet para-
dox (Black, 1948; Sen, 1970). One of the most prominent is Black’s single-peakedness theorem. Black showed that if
there is a linear ordering of the candidates relative to which each voter’s preferences have only one peak, a Condorcet
cycle is impossible. It appears not only that those results are hard to generalize to a multidimensional space, but also in
spite of all the virtues of single peaked preferences and their importance in political science, real electorates generally
do not satisfy those restrictions (Faliszewski et al., 2009).
A standard theoretical benchmark in the evaluation of the goodness of a voting rule is whether the rule’s winner
matches the Condorcet winner if one exists. A candidate who can beat any other candidate in pairwise comparison
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remains for many the most attractive social option, and therefore the Condorcet winner remains a central concept in
social choice. The Condorcet efficiency of a rule is the probability that this rule’s winner matches the Condorcet win-
ner, given that one exists in a random sample of ballots. Similarly, one can consider Borda efficiency. The classical
social choice literature estimates the Condorcet efficiency under the Impartial Culture assumption (see Gehrlein and
Fishburn, 1978; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2000; Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1978; Gehrlein, 1985, 1992). As in the situation
with a Condorcet paradox, this leads to the questionable conclusion that with a large number of candidates the Con-
dorcet efficiency decreases drastically. For example, for the class of weighted scoring rules, the Condorcet efficiency
is 0.535 for three candidates, under the Impartial Culture assumption (Gehrlein, 1999).
We suggest to go beyond those two popular benchmarks and look at all pairwise agreements for both winners and
losers among a larger set of rules. Thus, we extend the notion of efficiency to a much larger set of rules including the
Plurality rule, the Anti Plurality rule, the Single Transferable Vote rule, and the Coombs rule, along with the Condorcet
rule and the Borda rule. We also compare the social orders for all of these different rules.
The classical social choice literature is dominated by theoretical work, mathematical theorems and computer
simulations based on distributional assumptions which are heavily debated. Alternatives to specific assumptions, such
as the Impartial Culture assumption, the Unanimity assumption, and others, have not been developed. The scarcity of
empirical evidence on voter preferences is one major reason for this lack of alternatives in classical theory. Another
reason is that most available data sets contain, at best, partial rankings of options by voters.
Applying a large set of rules to data from real elections is challenging because most datasets from real elections
are dominated by partial ballots, i.e. voters can and do rank as many candidates as they want. This implies that, while
some voters provide full linear orders, others only rank a subset of candidates. However, most rules considered in the
theoretical literature are only defined for preferences represented by full linear orders.
We use the methodology suggested by Regenwetter et al. (2006) and Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007), which
allows us to work with a wide class of voting rules and make data analysis possible for partial rankings. We propose
three models of partial rankings to transform election data into binary relations: the Weak Order model (WO), the
Partial Order model (PO), and the Size Independent Linear Order model (SIM). All of these models work under
completely different assumptions which complement partially reported individual preferences. These models allow us
to test how sensitive the outcomes are to different underlying statistical models for partial ballots.
Another important issue we want to highlight is the robustness of election outcomes and the usage of inferential
statistics in social choice. While the theoretical literature bases many of its results on sampling distributions derived
from an Impartial Culture assumption or, in other words, a uniform distribution of voter preferences, empirical data an-
alyzes rarely use statistical inference. Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007) and Regenwetter et al. (2006) encourage
the use of inferential statistical methods. Regenwetter et al. (2006) and Regenwetter et al. (2009) demonstrate using
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a sampling approach that the behavior of the Condorcet rule and a class of scoring rules is extremely dependent on
the underlying theoretical assumptions. It appears that the widely used Impartial Culture assumption is a knife-edge
distribution over preference relationships which leads to the absence of a Condorcet winner and to ties for scoring
rules, whereas even a small deviation from this distribution can lead to dramatically different results. In this paper, we
use statistical methods, more specifically, bootstrap techniques, to show that the social orders computed using different
rules and agreement between them are not very sensitive to small data perturbations.
In practice, some rules are easier to implement than others. The Borda and Condorcet methods, as well as the
Single Transferable Vote, are among the most demanding ones — they technically require each voter to order all
choice alternatives on her ballot. Others, such as the Plurality rule, require each voter only to report the highest ranked
alternative. Nevertheless, we obtain high levels of agreement among all of these rules within each model of partial
rankings and across models. This finding of high levels of agreement is not sensitive to small data perturbations.
We conclude that our empirical evidence does not support the predictions of the theoretical literature either on
the prevalence of the Condorcet paradox or on the frequency of disagreement between rules. Felsenthal et al. (1993);
Niemi (1970); Regenwetter et al. (2002) find no empirical evidence of the Condorcet paradox in a large number of
surveys and ballot data, thereby suggesting that the theoretical predictions regarding the frequency of the Condorcet
paradox are exaggerated. Regenwetter et al. (2007) and Regenwetter et al. (2009) report a high level of agreement on
both winners and losers among a larger set of voting rules. In this study, we elaborate on those results.
Our findings suggest that in a number of situations, focused on gathering information rather than making a socially-
relevant decision, it is not necessary to implement the Condorcet procedure to obtain the Condorcet winner. Instead,
one could implement the less demanding Plurality procedure, similar to most presidential elections when each voter
only provides her best option. The Plurality procedure requires voters to report less information, and the result is
easier to tally. Thus, a less information-intensive procedure frequently determines the Condorcet winner correctly.
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Chapter 2
Methodology and Data
In our analysis, we use data from the presidential elections of the American Psychological Association (APA). The
APA presidential elections present a unique dataset, which represents the distribution of an electorate in one of the
largest scientific and professional organizations in the United States. Moreover, it is also a good approximation of a
political election, due to the politicized structure of the association itself. APA presidential elections run yearly and
provide a rich source of full and partial rankings for 5 candidates with an approximate size of the electorate of 20,000
voters. Meanwhile, most surveys and open source election ballots include a much smaller number of candidates
(usually three) or a much smaller voter pool (usually fewer than 2,000 voters). The particular advantage of the APA
data set is a combination of full (all candidates are ranked) and partial (some candidates are ranked) rankings provided
by the voters, which allows us to construct a diverse set of statistical models to estimate population profiles under a
variety of assumptions and to analyze various distributional characteristics based on these assumptions.
2.1 Data
The APA data contain a set of ballots with full or partial rankings of 5 alternatives. Table 2.1 demonstrates that partial
rankings represent a non-negligible fraction of the data since they make up from 38% to 79% of all ballots. It also
shows that partial rankings of all lengths are present in all 12 datasets.
One very common assumption in the theoretical social choice literature is the Impartial Culture assumption ac-
cording to which each possible linear order is equally probable. For 5 candidates we obtain 5! = 120 possible linear
orders. A regular Chi-square test rejects the Impartial Culture hypothesis at the 0.001 significance level for each of the
12 data sets.1 For illustrative purposes we graph the number of ballots containing each of the 120 linear orders for the
year 1998 in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1 compares the actual frequency of linear orders in the data (dashed lines) with the
number predicted by the Impartial Culture assumption (solid lines). The 95% confidence intervals are also presented
in Figure 2.1 (dotted lines). The other data sets give similar results and are omitted for brevity.
In each APA data set we observe all possible 120 linear orders. Therefore, another extreme theoretical assumption
1When only partial rankings are used, the hypothesis is rejected at an even lower significance level, because not all possible partial rankings are
present in the data. A description of models of partial rankings used in the test is provided below.
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Figure 2.1: Frequencies of Linear Orders in the 1998 APA Data.
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Table 2.1: Full and Partial Rankings in the Data.
Election Number of Candidates Ranked Number of
Year 5 4 3 2 1 Voters
1998 0.57 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.20 18,723
1999 0.56 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.18 18,398
2000 0.56 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.19 20,239
2001 0.57 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.20 17,911
2002 0.60 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.16 17,094
2003 0.21 0.36 0.08 0.14 0.21 17,956
2004 0.58 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.19 16,245
2005 0.58 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.16 14,506
2006 0.59 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.16 16,836
2007 0.62 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.16 13,318
2008 0.54 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.21 18,286
2009 0.58 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.21 15,313
of single peakedness is also rejected by the data in each election. In order to make inferences about the empirical
distribution of voters’ preferences and measure the robustness of this distribution to small perturbations, we employ
bootstrap techniques. We create ten thousand pseudosamples by sampling ballots from the empirical distribution
with replacement. Then, we apply the voting rules to the pseudosamples and check whether the pseudosamples yield
different social orders.2
2.2 Models of Partial Rankings
The APA data set is a rich source of full and partial rankings ballots. According to the structure of presidential
elections in the APA, voters can rank as many candidates as they want. Therefore, while some voters provide linear
orders by ranking all candidates, other voters only rank a subset of candidates and thereby provide partial rankings.
Some voting rules are only defined for linear order preferences; this creates an obstacle for empirical analysis. A
novel methodology suggested by Regenwetter et al. (2006) and Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007) allows us to
work with a wide class of voting rules and make data analysis possible for partial rankings. We use three models of
partial rankings mentioned earlier to transform the data into binary relations: the Weak Order model (WO), the Partial
Order model (PO), and the Size Independent Linear Order model (SIM).
The Weak Order model assumes that all unranked candidates are tied at the bottom. Voters only express their
preferences for their most preferred candidates and do not rank other candidates. This model assumes that the voter
prefers all ranked candidates to all unranked candidates, and does not discriminate between any two unranked candi-
dates. For positional rules, i.e. rules which rank all candidates in the social ordering, we use the notion of generalized
2We use both nonparametric and parametric bootstrap methods assuming independence of the true distribution of preferences from the decisions
of voters to report partial rankings.
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rank to specify a rank for each candidate. Suppose we have a voter’s preferences for five candidates (A, B, C, D, E)
where she ranks: A as the most preferable, B as the second, and C as the third preferred candidate. She does not state
any preferences for candidates D and E. According to the Weak Order model she prefers A to everyone else, B to
everyone else but A, C to D and E, and D is equivalent to E:
A
B
C
ED
The Partial Order model works with different assumptions. It does not assume any binary relations for a pair of
candidates when one or both of them are unranked. In the previous example, A is preferred to B, C, but not to D or E:
A
B
C
ED
The Size Independent Linear Order model (SIM) uses statistical inferences from linear orders in the data set. We
parameterize the data generating process as follows. We assume each agent is endowed with a full linear ranking
of alternatives, represented by a permutation of a sequence of alternatives (ABCDE would be an example of such
a permutation). The ranking for each voter is independently picked from the set of all permutations according to a
fundamental probability distribution over that set. After the ranking is chosen, a voter randomly picks the length of the
reported ranking, independently from other voters and from the chosen alternative; the voter non-strategically reports
the best k alternatives.
Denote the fundamental probabilities of orderings ABCDE and ABCED, pABCDE and pABCED respectively.
Let the probability of reporting just k = 3 alternatives be denoted by pk=3. Then, the probability of observing a partial
ranking ABC, pABC , in the previous example is computed as follows:
pABC = (pABCDE + pABCED) pk=3.
Similar formulas are used for other partially ranked ballots. This approach allows us to write down the likelihood of
observing the data sample, estimate a probability distribution over full rankings, the probability of reporting a partial
ranking of a specific length. This approach allows us to generate pseudosamples from the data-generating process
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using the estimated parameters. Since we impose structural assumptions and estimate structural parameters, we refer
to this bootstrapping process as a ”parametric bootstrap” procedure.
2.3 List of Social Choice Rules
We selected seven well-known voting rules to analyze. These rules belong to different classes and have different
algorithms, which vary in complexity.
• Plurality;
• Borda;
• Condorcet;
• Anti(Negative) Plurality;
• Single Transferable Vote (including Alternative Vote);
• Coombs;
• Plurality Runoff.
Most of the rules are based on the concept of generalized rank, introduced in Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007).
The representation of preferences in the form of generalized ranks is referred to as the generalized rank matrix. When
the preferences are linear orders, the generalized rank is a simple ranking of the cadidates, with 1 corresponding to the
best candidate and n corresponding to the worst candidate out of n. The generalized rank assigns noninteger ranks in
case of indifference.
2.3.1 The Plurality Rule
The matrix of binary relations is transformed into a generalized rank matrix.
Plurality score(Candidate) =

1, GR(Candidate)=1;
0, otherwise.
The total score is the sum of all Plurality scores for a given candidate over all rows, representing voter preferences.
The Winner is the candidate with the maximum total score.
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2.3.2 The Borda Rule
The matrix of binary relations is transformed into a generalized rank matrix. Each candidate has a generalized rank
for any given binary preference row. Here and everywhere else n is the total number of candidates.
Borda score(Candidate) = n− GR(Candidate)
The total score is the sum of all Borda scores for a given candidate over all voters. The Winner is the candidate with
the maximum total score.
2.3.3 The Condorcet Rule
This concept is presented in detail in Regenwetter et al. (2006). Choice alternative X is majority preferred to choice
alternative Y according to the Condorcet Rule if the majority of people prefer alternative X to alternative Y, i.e., if
the number of relations containing X  Y exceeds the number of relations containing Y  X . A candidate is
the Condorcet winner if she beats each competitor by the Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet paradox denotes the
fact that the Condorcet winner may not exist. While the Condorcet criterion is generally viewed as the most natural
implementation of democratic aggregation, a substantial theoretical literature has predicted an omnipresent threat of
the Condorcet Paradox, and leading textbooks strongly caution against using this method (e.g., Shepsle and Bonchek
(1997)). The Condorcet rule is rarely used in multi-candidate elections.
2.3.4 The Anti-Plurality Rule
The matrix of binary relations is transformed to a generalized rank matrix. Each candidate has a generalized rank for
any given binary preference row.
Anti Plurality score(Candidate) =

1, GR(Candidate)=n;
0, otherwise.
The total score is the sum of all Anti-Plurality scores for a given candidate over all voters. The Winner is the candidate
with the minimum total score.
2.3.5 The Single Transferable Vote Rule
The STV rule provides the STV winner (for a one seat election) and the STV social order.
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The matrix of binary relations is transformed to a generalized rank matrix. Each candidate has a generalized rank
for a given binary preference row.
The STV Rule consists of 4 steps:
1. Calculate the Droop quota (DQ) for a particular number of seats;
DQ =
Number of Voters
Number of Seats + 1
+ 1
2. Apply the Plurality rule and define the set of winners;
Plurality score(Candidate)

> DQ, Candidate is winner;
< DQ, Candidate is not a winner.
3. If the number of winners is less than the number of seats, eliminate one candidate with the minimum Plurality
score. Ties are broken at random.
4. Readjust voter preferences for (n-I) candidates and repeat steps 2 through 4 until the set of winners is defined.
Here and everywhere else I is the number of eliminated candidates.
The STV order is defined by the sequence of additional candidates to get a seat as the number of seats increases.
For example, for five candidates the one seat election winner is candidate A, for a two seat election the winners are
candidates A and D; for a three seat election the winners are candidates E, D, and A; for four seats the winners are C,
D, E, and A. Then, the social order is A  D  E  C  B (we omit the  sign hereafter).
2.3.6 The Coombs Rule
The rule consists of 4 steps:
1. Calculate the Droop quota (DQ) for a particular number of seats;
DQ =
Number of Voters
Number of Seats + 1
+ 1
2. Apply the Plurality rule and define the set of winners;
Plurality score(Candidate)

> DQ, Candidate is the winner;
< DQ, Candidate is not a winner.
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3. If no candidate (or fewer candidates than the number of seats) exceeds the Droop quota, eliminate the candidate
with the maximum Anti Plurality score. Ties are broken at random.
4. Readjust voter preferences for (n-I) candidates and repeat steps 2 through 4 until the set of winners is defined.
(For each next step the criterion for Anti Plurality changes.)
Anti Plurality score(Candidate) =

1, GR(Candidate)=n+1-I;
0, Otherwise.
The order is defined similarly to the STV rule.
2.3.7 The Plurality Runoff Rule
The rule consists of 4 steps:
1. Calculate the Droop quota (DQ);
DQ =
Number of Voters
2
2. Apply the Plurality rule, calculate the plurality score and define the winner;
Plurality score(Candidate)

> DQ, Candidate is the winner;
< DQ, Candidate is not a winner.
3. If there is no winner, eliminate all but two candidates with the highest plurality score;
4. Readjust voter preferences for the 2 remaining candidates and apply the Plurality rule.
The Plurality Runoff rule selects a winner only. To define loser coincidence, we assume that all candidates but the
Plurality Runoff winner form a set of Plurality Runoff losers. If the loser of the other rule is in this set, we count that
as agreement on losers.
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Chapter 3
Results
3.1 Agreement on Winners and Losers
We analyze 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-samples drawn with replacement from 12 data sets using 3 different models of
partial rankings, which makes a total of 360,000 samples. Each pseudo-sample contains on the order of 20,000 voters
— we always draw as many as in each original data set. Using each set of 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-samples, we
compute rates of agreement between pairs of voting rules for each of the 12 data sets for each of the 3 models of
partial rankings. Thus, we obtain rates of agreement between all pairs of rules for 36 sets of data. To present our
results graphically, we split the unit interval into five bins of equal size, which represent rates of agreement falling into
the intervals [0,0.2], (0.2,0.4], (0.4,0.6], (0.6,0.8], (0.8,1]. For each pair of rules, we compute the number of sets of
data out of 36, for which the rate of agreement falls into each of the five bins.
Figure 3.1 presents the rates of agreement on first and last ranked options, i.e. winners and losers, among seven
different voting rules across twelve years and three partial rankings models. The upper left diagram of Figure 3.1
compares the rates of agreement between the Condorcet winner and the winners according to the other six voting
rules. The voting rule in the center represents the reference rule (Condorcet). Each leg represents a unit interval with 0
at the reference rule and 1 at the end of the leg. Each leg can have up to five circles, which represent the five intervals
mentioned before. The diameter of each circle visualizes the number of data sets and models for which the rates of
agreement between the two rules fall into the corresponding interval. The number of data sets is also written inside
each circle. The maximum number is 36.
Therefore, the position of a circle on each leg represents the level of agreement, while the size of the circle
represents the frequency at which we observe this level of agreement. When the largest circle is at the end of a leg,
the corresponding rule almost perfectly agrees with the reference rule on winners. Similarly, when the largest circle is
at the start of the leg, the two rules almost never agree on the winners.
Similarly, the upper right diagram in Figure 3.1 presents the rates of agreement on winners between the Borda rule
and the other six rules. The two lower diagrams in Figure 3.1 present the rates of agreement on losers between the
Condorcet rule (on the left) and the Borda rule (on the right) with the other rules. We use two theoretical benchmarks
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to compare with our empirical results: agreement among rules under the Impartial Culture (IC) assumption and agree-
ment among rules under the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption of Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976a). Both
assumptions are widely used in the theoretical social choice literature. The rate of agreement under IC corresponds to
the location of a square and of IAC to the location of an X on each leg of the four diagrams in Figure 3.1. We obtained
these theoretical rates of agreement by Monte-Carlo simulation.
For instance, suppose we are interested in how often the Anti Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule agree on the
winner in our 36 data sets. There are four circles on the leg which connects the Condorcet rule and the Anti Plurality
rule in the upper left panel of Figure 3.1. The largest circle is located at the end of the leg. This means that bootstrapped
robustness is relatively high. In fact, this means that for 23 out of 36 data sets the rate of agreement on the winner
between the Anti Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule in bootstrapped pseudo-samples is above 80%. The second
largest circle corresponds to the first bin on the leg. This circle indicates, that for 8 out of 36 data sets the rate of
agreement between the Anti Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule in bootstrapped pseudo-samples is below 20%.
Thus, the two upper panels of Figure 3.1 present in a visual form measures of Condorcet/Borda efficiency of the
other six rules. If the position of a circle on a leg is far from (close to) the center, then the Condorcet/Borda efficiency
of the corresponding rule is high (low). The upper left diagram of Figure 3.1 indicates that the Condorcet efficiency of
all the rules, except Anti Plurality, is very high. Similarly, the upper right diagram indicates that the Borda efficiency
of all rules is relatively high.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates that the rates of agreement between rules observed in our data sets for all voting rules are
extremely high. Figure 3.1 also shows that this result has a very high level of bootstrapped confidence. These rates
of agreement are much higher than those predicted by the theoretical literature, especially the rates obtained from
simulations under the IC and IAC assumptions, as depicted in Figure 3.1. This disagreement between the empirical
and theoretical results supports our intuition that neither IC nor IAC should be viewed as good approximations of
distributions of electorate preferences. Figure 3.1 shows that our conclusions are broadly consistent across all models
and all years, within each model and within each year. This suggests, that our results are robust to the choice of model
of partial rankings and to the choice of data set.
Notice that, when applied to the APA data sets, the complex multistage rules (Single Transferable Vote, Coombs,
Plurality Runoff) provide results very similar to the simple rules (Plurality, Anti-Plurality). Agreement among the
Borda rule, the Plurality rule, the Condorcet rule, the Single Transferable Vote rule, and the Plurality Runoff rule on
winners is virtually perfect. Agreement among the same rules on losers is also relatively high. This is consistent with
a result of Saari (1999), that in absence of Condorcet cycles the Condorcet rule and the Borda rule have a good chance
of providing the same social orders. Surprisingly, the Plurality rule agrees with many other rules on winners almost
perfectly, even though it disregards a large part of the binary preferences and only takes into consideration first ranks.
16
Figure 3.1: Agreement on Winners and Losers for Seven Rules
Condorcet rule, Winners Borda rule, Winners
Condorcet rule, Losers Borda rule, Losers
See the description of the diagrams in the text. When computing the rate of agreement with the Plurality Runoff rule, we assume
that there is agreement if the loser of a rule belongs to the set of losers of the Plurality Runoff rule.
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For five candidates the theoretical probability of a Condorcet cycle under the Impartial Culture assumption for
linear orders is 0.251 (Riker, 1982). In contrast to the theoretical result, what we observe in the data is the complete
absence of the Condorcet paradox in more than 90 percent of all bootstrapped pseudo-samples. This result is robust
to the choice of model of partial rankings and to the choice of data set.
Assumptions of single peaked and ”value restricted” preferences are typically used to explain the absence of the
Condorcet paradox. However, these restrictions on the domain, aimed at eliminating the possibility of the Condorcet
paradox, rule out some linear order preferences. Since we do observe all linear orders in all the datasets, we can
conclude that the assumption of single—peaked preferences is also too restrictive as a description of the APA elec-
torate. Thus, none of the standard assumptions on the distribution of preferences can be used to explain our results,
suggesting a need for more behaviorally disciplined models of distributions of preferences.
3.2 Small Samples Results: Sample size
Another point of interest is the robustness of our results to the size of the sample. So far, we have analyzed original
data sets and pseudo-samples drawn from them with the sample size equal to approximately 20,000 voters. We now
consider pseudo-samples with much smaller sample sizes. Figure 3.2 presents the rates of agreement on winners
between the Condorcet rule and the other six rules (akin to the upper left panel of Figure 3.1) for sample sizes 5, 10,
500 and 1,000.
The comparison of rates of agreement in Figures 3.2 and 3.1 demonstrates the high level of robustness of our
results to sample size. Sample size of 1,000 voters is sufficient to obtain the same patterns as in the original data sets
of size 20,000. Moreover, agreement rates converge very quickly. An increase from sample size 5 to sample size 500
already demonstrates substantial improvements in the rates of agreement on the winner.
3.3 Small Samples Results: Bootstrap size
The second robustness exercise we do is check the dependence of the results on the bootstrap size. Bootstrap size
represents the number of bootstrap iterations. So far, we have analyzed pseudo-samples with the bootstrap size equal
to 10,000. We now consider pseudo-samples with much smaller bootstrap sizes. We keep the size of pseudo-samples
equal to the sample size. Figure 3.3 presents the rates of agreement on winners between the Condorcet rule and the
other six rules (akin to the upper left panel of Figure 3.1) for bootstrap sizes 5, 10, 500 and 1,000.
The comparison of rates of agreement in Figures 3.3 and 3.1 demonstrates the high level of robustness of our results
to bootstrap size. In fact, bootstrap size of 10 is sufficient to obtain essentially the same results as under bootstrap
size 10,000. This demonstrates that, although results under bootstrap size 10,000 are more accurate, the increase from
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Figure 3.2: Agreement on Winners for Different Sample Sizes
Sample size 5 Sample size 10
Sample size 500 Sample size 1,000
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bootstrap size 10 to bootstrap size 10,000 is not necessary to get a good idea of the results.
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Figure 3.3: Agreement on Winners for Different Bootstrap Sizes
Bootstrap size 5 Bootstrap size 10
Bootstrap size 500 Bootstrap size 1,000
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Chapter 4
Conclusions and Discussion
We study the properties of a set of well-known voting rules on real electorate large scale data from presidential
elections of the American Psychological Association for the years from 1998 to 2009. The APA dataset presents a
rare and rich source of information about full and partially ranked preferences of large electorates. These data allow
us to apply a wide list of voting rules to the ballots. In addition, the complexity of the alternative vote procedure used
in APA elections makes strategic voting difficult, thus, justifying our assumption of truthful revelation of preferences.
First, we applied a wide list of rules to the original data, and found strong agreement of all rules with respect to
the choice of the first- and last-ranked candidate. To control for the influence of small random factors, we generated
10,000 samples of pseudo-data by drawing data from the original samples with replacement. We also verified whether
our results were driven by the size of the sample. We documented the absence of Condorcet paradox in all 12 original
data sets and in a set of pseudo-samples of size from 5 to 1,000. We found that in all 12 election data sets and
pseudo-samples generated from them in virtually all Condorcet social orders were complete linear orders.
This finding stood out in contrast with the dominant view in the theoretical literature that Condorcet cycles are a
problem when implementing social decision making. Nonetheless, this finding was consistent with previous studies
on real datasets, which emphasized that the Condorcet rule performs well in real elections. We also ruled out single
peaked preferences, the most common explanation for the absence of cycles. In our data, every complete linear order
was used by at least one voter.
Second, we reported outstanding agreement among different rules on winners and on losers. This high level of
agreement was obtained for rules of different intensity and complexity. For example, the one-stage Plurality rule
agreed well on winners with the multistage Alternative Vote rule. Scoring rules (Plurality, Borda, Anti-Plurality)
agreed with the more mathematically complex Condorcet rule, which exploits the pairwise comparison principle.
Voting rules of very different mathematical nature and with very different properties (see rules comparison in Tideman,
2006) tended to agree almost perfectly on first- and last-rank candidates. In all 12 datasets we determined first- and
last- rank candidates with high confidence for each rule, and they matched nearly perfectly throughout.
Third, we demonstrated the robustness of our results to different formats of data input. We did not discard partial
ranking data since they represent up to 40% of ballots. Taking partial rankings data into account required additional
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simplifying assumptions to make all voting rules applicable. Our analysis demonstrated that, despite major differences
in modeling assumptions, agreement among voting rules was consistently high.
Fourth, we studied the behavior of agreement rates as the size of the pseudo-samples decreased. Naturally, under
an impartial culture, it was much easier to get Condorcet cycles randomly when the pseudo-sample was of size 5 than
when it was of size 500. We found that not only the agreement rates were high in pseudo-samples of size 17,000 (like
the data), but also that the agreement rates remained high for samples larger than 500. This implies that surveying
500 or so people would be sufficient to measure the preferences of the population and predict an election outcome
consistent with all rules.
Our findings remove much of the gloom around the social choice literature. Although theoretical assumptions
about electoral preference distributions lead to stark predictions about agreement rates between voting rules, we find
remarkable agreement among these rules when applied to real election data. First, this implies that usual theorems
about disagreement of rules or about the possibility of Condorcet cycles are relevant only for a narrow class of pref-
erence distributions. For instance, the Impartial Culture assumption, notorious for producing disagreements, does not
seem to describe the observed patterns of social choice well.
Second, we find that simpler and less data-intensive rules frequently produce the same results as do complicated
data-intensive rules. The agreement rate between the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule is virtually 100% percent
in our permuted-samples experiment, although the Plurality rule requires just asking about each voter’s favorite candi-
date, whereas the implementation of the Condorcet rule involves collecting detailed preferences of all voters and then
conducting all pairwise comparisons for every pairing of candidates.
Our findings support previous results that the assumptions used in the theoretical social choice literature are ex-
treme. Our findings also highlight that there is demand for new and more behaviorally disciplined models of distri-
butions of preferences that are consistent with real-life data. Future work will benefit from a more detailed analysis
of large scale data which will help uncover features and characteristics of real electorate profiles leading to such
outstanding agreement.
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